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Eleven Things They Don’t Tell You About 
Law & Economics: 
An Informal Introduction to Political 
Economy and Law† 
Abstract 
Many legal scholars have critiqued the dominant law and 
economics paradigm. However, important work is all too often 
neglected because it is not popularized in an accessible form. This 
Article features experts who synthesize their key insights into 
memorable and concise vignettes. Our 11 Things project is inspired 
by the work of the Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang, who 
distilled many facets of his work into a book called 23 Things They 
Don’t Tell You About Capitalism. That book was a runaway success, 
translated for markets around the globe, because it challenged 
conventional economic reasoning with a series of short and 
memorable analyses and narratives that translated academic 
research into accessible language. 
A project like Chang’s can also inform economic analysis of 
law. We believe that law and economics pedagogy would benefit 
from a shift in focus. Scholars are developing increasingly data-
driven and empirical research, while too many casebooks and 
teaching approaches covering the first-year U.S. law school 
curriculum remain mired in toy models and simplistic accounts of 
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economic life. This Article features critical insights that “they” 
(politicians, bureaucrats, and, all too frequently, first-year 
professors and casebook authors) tend to neglect in their 
understanding of commercial life. Each piece critically explores a 
facet of the theoretical foundations of law and economics. They 
connect contemporary developments in policy research to classical 
economic analysis of law. They bridge the gap between scholarship 
and pedagogy, introducing students, practitioners, and 
policymakers to political economy as a vital alternative in policy 
analysis. 
Introduction 
Cambridge University economist Ha-Joon Chang has devoted 
decades of an illustrious career to challenging orthodoxy in his field. 
For example, in academic journals, he has repeatedly criticized the 
manner in which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) handled 
the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.1 The IMF’s approach was 
focused on austerity: raising taxes and cutting government 
spending.2 The results were often disastrous. Chang proposed an 
alternative approach, part of a more general political economy of 
regulation countering usual stories of state incapacity.3 He has also 
undermined simplistic narratives of intellectual property’s role in 
promoting innovation.4 
Despite Chang’s rigorous work (and that of many other 
economists) in standard academic articles, technocratic 
policymakers have tended to ignore such messages.5 Given the 
mathematization of economics, it is easy for policymakers to retreat 
into formal models rather than grapple with the real-world 
 
 1. See Ha-Joon Chang, Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, 26 WORLD DEV. 1555, 
1560 (1998); Ha-Joon Chang, Institutions and Economic Development: 
Theory, Policy and History, 7 J. INST. ECON. 473, 473 (2011). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 21 
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 703 (1997); Ha-Joon Chang, Breaking the Mould: An 
Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market 
and the State, 26 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 539 (2002). 
 4. See generally Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development: Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 287 (2001) 
(examining the desirability of the currently dominant form of intellectual property 
rights regime). 
 5. Cf. Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital 
Deformation of U.S. Competition Policy, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST 
CHRON., May 2017, at 46, 51 (critiquing technocratic antitrust policymakers for their 
failure to adequately address real-world issues through their modeling). 
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limitations of those models.6 Austerity-oriented managers at 
international organizations like the IMF and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have another mode of deflection. They peddle 
just-so stories to justify policy decisions to the public, relying on a 
mix of math and narrative, modeling and common sense. In their 
view, a deficit-ridden country in the midst of a currency crisis has 
to tighten its belt and structurally adjust to new market realities by 
abandoning many labor protections and social welfare programs. 
To counter the common sense of neoliberalism, Chang sought 
attention well beyond traditional academic venues. He distilled 
many facets of his research into a series of clarifying concepts in his 
book titled 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism.7 This 
book was a runaway success, translated into many languages 
around the globe, because it questioned conventional wisdom in 
compelling and accessible prose.8 Companies should not be run only 
in the interest of their owners, Chang insists, but rather should be 
accountable to a range of stakeholders, including their workers, 
local communities, and anyone affected by their externalities.9 In a 
chapter entitled “The US does not have the highest living standard 
in the world,” Chang denies that average (or even median) GDP 
rankings settle the question of quality of life.10 The “things” Chang 
alludes to in the title, patiently backed with references to empirical 
work, are a bracing reminder that many examples of “received 
wisdom” are not that wise after all. 
Inspired by Chang, I asked attendees at a 2017 meeting of law 
and political economy scholars, sponsored by the Association for the 
Promotion of Political Economy and Law (APPEAL),11 to think 
about what a 23 Things They Don’t Tell You project would look like 
in law and economics. Ten responded, and the result is the collection 
you are now reading. To fully grasp our purpose and message, it is 
helpful to have an overview of the state of law and economics and 
to better understand the missions of scholars and advocates who 
believe that economic and political life are inextricably intertwined. 
The field of law and economics has featured a strange dualism 
in the past decade: increasingly data-driven and empirical research 
is presented at conferences, while key policy advocates (as well as 
 
 6. See id. 
 7. See HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT CAPITALISM 
(2011). 
 8.  See id. 
 9.  Id. at 11. 
 10.  Id. at 102. 
 11.  See APPEAL, politicaleconomylaw.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
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some casebooks on property, torts, and contracts) present overly 
schematic and ideologically biased accounts of the nature of 
economic exchange.12 APPEAL seeks to right that balance, 
enriching law and economics instruction by promoting more 
complex and realistic perspectives on regulation, litigation, and 
legislation.13 
The short contributions that appear below echo Chang’s 
method, encapsulating (as their titles) a sentence-length challenge 
to the types of economic orthodoxy common at both the highest 
levels of policymaking and the most basic levels of instruction. 
Jamee Moudud frames the discussion by remarking on the 
fundamental nature of law in shaping markets. Just as Chang 
opened 23 Things by insisting “[t]here is no such thing as a free 
market,”14 Moudud questions any project that strictly distinguishes 
the political, legal, and economic spheres. 
Martha T. McCluskey’s contribution, intriguingly titled “All 
Costs Have a Right,” inverts the usual law and economics objection 
to expansive human rights (the weary reminder to idealists, “all 
rights have a cost”). Recalling the interventions of early twentieth-
century legal realists, McCluskey shows how the concept of “cost” 
itself is contingent on notions of rights (e.g., to property, or against 
confiscation). This transvaluation of the role of cost and money also 
motivates Rohan Grey’s contribution, which explains the project of 
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). MMT, in turn, supports Raúl 
Carrillo’s advocacy for a jobs guarantee in the twenty-first century 
to update and expand Keynesian New Deal programs like the 
Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation 
Corps. 
Several contributors encapsulate fundamental challenges to 
how value is determined in late capitalist societies. I recapitulate a 
long literature on the shortcomings of public accounting to criticize 
the blandly neutral valuation of arms dealing and extractive 
finance in calculations of Gross Domestic Product. John Haskell 
draws on Bourdieusian sociology to question the degree to which 
education enhances productivity (or advances other social ends). 
Reza Dibadj underlines the importance of transaction costs in 
economic exchange. Lenore Palladino takes on doctrinaire 
managerialism by demonstrating the dark side of financialization. 
 
 12.  See JAMES KWAK, ECONOMISM: BAD ECONOMICS AND THE RISE OF 
INEQUALITY (1st ed. 2017). 
 13. See Martha T. McCluskey, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Taub, Law and 
Economics: Contemporary Approaches, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 303 n.17 (2016). 
 14. CHANG, supra note 7, at 1. 
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It is hard to read her contribution without coming away with a 
strong sense of the shortcomings of shareholder maximization as a 
theory of corporate governance. 
Three other essays iconoclastically advance the value of 
cooperation as against competition. Sandeep Vaheesan shows how 
competition, the watchword of contemporary United States 
antitrust, may actually be undermining productivity and living 
standards, rather than improving them. James J. Varellas takes 
this perspective to an international level, defending human rights 
and labor protections in trade agreements. And Jedidiah J. Kroncke 
prescribes a “high road” approach to economic development, 
promoting a vision of high-quality jobs encouraging more security, 
spending, and investment. 
The essays below are intended as provocations—ways of 
shaking up received ideas about legal economic matters. But we do 
not intend them as mere popularization. Like blogging or tweeting, 
new forms of analysis and advocacy can fundamentally reshape a 
field.15 As Tyler Cowen recently observed about economics blogs: 
[O]n-line education, as a broad concept, is much further along 
than many people realize . . . .I love it when people describe 
writing a blog, or writing on the internet, as “popularizing” 
economics or something similar. That is a sign they don’t 
understand what is going on, that they don’t understand there 
is such a thing as “internet economics,” and also a sign they will 
not be effective competition. It’s really about “the internet way 
of writing and communicating” vs. non-internet methods. The 
internet methods may or may not be popular, and may or may 
not be geared toward a wide audience, so they are not the same 
as popularizing. One point of the internet is to find an outlet for 
super-unpopular material. What’s important right now is to 
develop internet methods of thinking and communicating, and 
not to obsess over reaching the largest possible numbers of 
people.16 
We are rarely in agreement with Cowen on the particulars of 
economic policy,17 but he is dead-on with respect to the need to 
develop new forms of understanding in an era of rapidly changing 
 
 15. See, e.g., LEE BADGETT, THE PUBLIC PROFESSOR (2016) (explaining the 
importance of dissemination to scholarly engagement, and how the communicative 
imperative in turn can reshape and deepen scholarly understanding); MARK 
CARRIGAN, SOCIAL MEDIA FOR ACADEMICS (James Clark et al. eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
 16. See Tyler Cowen, My Personal Moonshot, MERCATUS CENTER: THE BRIDGE 
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/commentary/my-personal-moonshot 
(emphasis in original). 
 17. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost-Cutting, 77 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 190 (describing some of Cowen’s statements about 
inequality). 
102 Law & Inequality [Vol. 37: 1 
communication. We hope that our Article can provide a quick, 
shorthand, but still academically rigorous, way of challenging legal 
economic orthodoxy. We welcome kindred spirits to further explore 
with us a new law and economics—one that is more empirically 
accurate and normatively compelling than the vision of the field 
now animating many private law discussions in law school 
classrooms and economic discussions among bureaucratic and 
political decision-makers. 
1. Corporate Financialization Hurts Jobs and Wages 
Lenore Palladino 
Despite energetic conversations around stagnant wages and 
job creation, few consider that the financialization of the United 
States’ public corporations has contributed just as much to economic 
inequality as more commonly cited factors. The debate seems well-
settled: scholars point to globalization,18 skill-biased technical 
change,19 and the decline of union density.20 Others point to the ‘rise 
of the robots,’21 claiming that automation and technology are 
driving us towards a jobless future.22 
I define corporate financialization as the shift within public 
companies from making money off of selling goods and services to 
making a higher proportion of their profits off of financial activity 
and sending those profits back to shareholders rather than 
investing them in the firm or its workers. Corporate America has 
shifted its behavior dramatically across industries—the ratio of 
financial profits out of overall corporate profits has increased 
markedly in the last few decades, and trillions have been spent by 
corporations purchasing back their own stock simply to increase 
their share price since such maneuvers became covered by a 
regulatory safe harbor in 1982.23 
 
 18. See BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE 
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1st ed. 2016). 
 19. See David H. Autor et al., Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed 
the Labor Market?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1169, 1169 (1998). 
 20. See JAKE ROSENFELD ET AL., ECON. POL. INST., UNION DECLINE LOWERS 
WAGES OF NONUNION WORKERS 1 (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/1128
11.pdf. 
 21. See Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from 
US Labor Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23285, Mar. 
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23285. 
 22. See LAWRENCE MISHEL & JOSH BIVENS, THE ZOMBIE ROBOT ARGUMENT 
LURCHES ON 4 (Econ. Pol. Inst., 2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/126750.pdf. 
 23. See William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What 
Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 880–82 
(2017). 
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Some think that the United States’ largest businesses function 
as they did in the post-World War II era: they earn profits, use those 
profits in part to enrich their top CEOs, but also to invest in their 
workforce, innovation, and in better prices for all of us. But 
somewhere along the way, starting in the Reagan administration, 
this productive cycle was broken due to government regulations and 
reforms in corporate governance, and corporate America started 
making more money by moving money around than they did by 
selling us actual goods and services.24 The shift to shareholder 
primacy—in which profits are increasingly devoted to rewarding 
shareholders—was led by our industrial mainstays. 
Once corporate profit-making became dependent on super-fast 
computers and top executives with MBAs, investing in a stable and 
productive workforce was not essential, and as a result wages and 
jobs declined.25 The last few decades have seen the rise of the 
fissured workplace, as firms increasingly outsource once-core 
functions, making jobs increasingly precarious.26 Firms made these 
choices in direct response to rising pressure from capital markets to 
move money out of the firm to shareholders and keep share prices 
steadily rising—choices that were sweetened by the fact that CEOs 
were increasingly paid in company stock.27 “Before the 1970s, 
American nonfinancial corporations consistently paid out about 
50% of profits to shareholders, while retaining the rest for 
investment.”28 Now, shareholder payouts may exceed 100% of 
reported profits, because firms borrow in order to lift payouts even 
higher.29 
 
 24. See Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3 
SOC. ECON. REV. 173, 175 (2005); WALLACE C. TURBEVILLE, FINANCIALIZATION & 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.demos.org/publication/financiali
zation-equal-opportunity. 
 25. See TURBEVILLE, supra note 24, at 14. 
 26. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD 
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). 
 27. See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV. Sept. 
2014, at 10, https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity. 
 28. MIKE KONCZAL ET AL., ENDING SHORT-TERMISM: AN INVESTMENT AGENDA 
FOR GROWTH (Roosevelt Inst., Nov. 6, 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/11/Ending-Short-Termism.pdf. 
 29. Id. (“[O]ver the past 30 years, shareholder payouts have averaged 90 percent 
of reported profits. In several years, including 2014, total payouts have actually been 
greater than total profits. Almost all the increase is due to buybacks—corporations’ 
purchases of their own shares—which were practically nonexistent before the 1980s 
but now account for nearly half of corporations’ payouts to shareholders.”); see also 
J.W. MASON, DISGORGE THE CASH: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN CORPORATE 
BORROWING AND INVESTMENT 14 (Roosevelt Inst., Feb. 25, 2015), http://rooseveltins
titute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Disgorge-the-Cash.pdf. 
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Thus the changing nature of work—the rise of the fissured 
workplace and the gig economy—is driven not just by a generic 
drive for profit or the attributes of the “knowledge economy,” but a 
structural shift within corporations from productive to financialized 
profit-making. The relentless search for short-term profits 
expresses itself through squeezing employees’ pay, transforming 
employees into independent contractors to avoid paying benefits or 
having responsibility for pensions, and outsourcing work to 
contracting firms that compete to pay lower and lower wages.30 If 
firms do not count on their employees to come up with the next big 
productivity improvement or exciting product idea, because they 
make their money from secondary market trading and collecting 
interest payments, there is no reason to invest in employee 
longevity with the firm. 
One example of rising financialization has been the dramatic 
increase in stock buybacks and the concurrent decrease in 
productive investment—buybacks being a practice that serves no 
productive purpose, but are conducted simply to boost share price.31 
Pressures on firms increased with the rise of “activist investors,” 
formerly known as corporate raiders.32 As institutional investors 
became large shareholders of major corporations, they pressured 
firms to maximize short-term profits to push up share prices.33 
Since such institutional investors could move their investments 
around easily, firms grew more and more responsive to capital 
markets rather than to their customers.34 The rise of private equity 
and the increase in leveraged buyouts has led to extractive financial 
strategies in which firms cut jobs and reduce wages in order to 
extract maximum wealth for the holders of equity.35 Key regulatory 
and legislative changes allowed for this shift. In 1982, Congress 
passed the safe-harbor provision for buybacks, which would 
formerly have left companies open to charges of market 
manipulation.36 Another regulatory shift allowed CEO 
“performance pay” to be deducted from corporate tax and 
incentivized corporations to pay CEOs in stock.37 
 
 30. See WEIL, supra note 26. 
 31. See MASON, supra note 29, at 14. 
 32. See WEIL, supra note 26. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See EILEEN APPELBAUM, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: WHEN WALL STREET 
MANAGES MAIN STREET 193–200 (2014). 
 36. See SEC Safe Harbor Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18. 
 37. See id. 
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Though the literature is still nascent, several scholars have 
examined the direct negative impact of corporate financialization 
on income inequality. One study found that financialization, net of 
other factors, could account for more than half of the decline in 
labor’s share of income in the nonfinancial sector of the economy, 
and is comparable to the effect of de-unionization, globalization, and 
technological shifts.38 Others look directly at the impact of 
financialization on declining corporate investment, finding that the 
financial profit rate is correlated with a significant decline in 
investment, especially for large firms.39 Less investment can mean 
less to spend on improving the skills and productivity of one’s 
workforce. 
To be sure, financialization is not the only driver of labor 
market challenges, but it has become increasingly impossible to 
think about how to solve problems in the labor market without 
taking on corporate financialization. It is not simply that firms want 
to spend less money on workers—it is that they actually need them 
less and so the incentive to invest in a high-quality workforce is 
much reduced. In order to have a stable and productive workforce, 
the incentives that drive corporations to financialize must be 
reformed. 
2. All Costs Have a Right.†† 
Martha T. McCluskey 
To solve problems of inequality and insecurity, we need to 
advance universal human economic rights, not just increase 
discretionary targeted redistributive spending. This is the opposite 
of the conventional law and economic wisdom. 
Orthodox law and economics tells us: all rights have a cost.40  
Law can allocate economic gain, but not generate it. Any new 
 
 38. See Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. 
Income Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOC. 1284, 1313 (2013). 
 39. See Leila E. Davis, Financialization and the Non-Financial Corporation: An 
Investigation of Firm-Level Investment Behavior in the United States, 69 
METROECONOMICA 270, 270 (2018). 
 ††. Thanks to Emily Villano of the LPEblog for helpful editorial suggestions on 
another version of this paper, which was published as a blog post at https://lpeblog.
org/2018/04/05/economic-human-rights-not-tough-policy-tradeoffs/. A version of this 
essay was also produced in 2017 as part of a short audiovideo collection. APPEAL, 
Five Things They Don’t Tell You About Law and Economics (Oct. 18, 2017), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoak05emri4&feature=youtu.be. 
 40. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1758, 1771 (2008) (arguing that governance always requires tradeoffs, so a right 
to education will come at the expense of health care or police protection); Richard A. 
Epstein, Living Dangerously: A Defense of “Mortal Peril”, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 
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economic rights aimed at alleviating socioeconomic disadvantages 
will thus require an inevitable tradeoff in public or private 
spending—that new right must come at the expense of some other 
economic benefit. Under this logic, a new legal right to affordable 
health care would mean fewer resources are available for education 
or jobs. In addition, this theory warns that an entitlement to 
economic support would replace market discipline with incentives 
for waste and abuse, further draining available resources. 
What orthodox law and economics does not tell us: all costs 
have a right. That is, any costs associated with new economic rights 
arise not from essential economics, but from contingent legal and 
political arrangements. Particular legal and political regimes 
produce, organize, and limit access to human needs like education 
or health care.41 Law itself shapes the market forces that appear to 
be disrupted when law re-allocates rights to advance general 
human needs. 
On the question of health care, for example, a complex system 
of legal rights and legal institutions already depends on government 
power to advance economic gain for some at the expense of health 
and economic security for others.42 Legal protections and privileges 
that distribute risks and rewards in health care include patent 
rights, insurance regulation, corporate governance rules, antitrust 
law, criminal law, and tax policy.43 
These legal rights are not firmly settled, natural, or necessary 
features of impartial economics. Instead, they are continually 
questioned and modified under the influence of specific contested 
interests and ideologies. Powerful industries regularly engage in 
extensive lobbying, litigation, and advocacy to re-design laws in 
their favor.44 The United States health industry, for example, spent 
half a billion dollars in 2016 on lobbying, and pharmaceutical 
 
914–16 (arguing that a categorical right to health care based on moral resistance to 
“letting people die” ignores that spending to keep one person alive could instead be 
directed toward providing medical care for many poor people). 
 41. See e.g., International Health Care System Profiles, What Is the Role of 
Government?, https://international.commonwealthfund.org/features/government_ro
le/ (describing the role of different governments in health care). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., 8 IMPORTANT REGULATIONS IN UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE, REGIS 
COLLEGE, https://online.regiscollege.edu/blog/8-important-regulations-united-stat
es-health-care/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). 
 44. Dhruv Khullar, The Unhealthy Politics of Pork: How It Increases Your 
Medical Costs, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/ups
hot/the-unhealthy-politics-of-pork-how-it-increases-your-medical-costs.html          
(discussing the implications of health care spending data). 
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companies, hospitals, and health professionals were among the 
largest contributors45 to this “market” for legal power. 
New human rights to egalitarian economic support can 
similarly work to re-arrange economic gain and loss as a legitimate 
and beneficial function of democracy. As Sabeel Rahman explains, 
basic human economic needs like health care, housing, food, and 
water are often provided, produced, and governed through 
intertwined public and private structures operating to create and 
entrench systemic disadvantages and exclusions.46 Solutions to 
inequality will only be meaningful if they go beyond redistributing 
income to changing the background legal rules and governance 
systems that control vital goods and services.47 
We should not presume that new human economic rights are 
zero sum transfers or costly distortions of optimal economic 
conditions. That conventional “law and economics” thinking rests 
on a simplistic assumption of an essential market order that 
transcends law and politics, thereby closing off analysis of how re-
structuring that market could generate far better economic and 
social outcomes. In contrast, the more complete and realistic 
perspective of political economy recognizes that legal entitlements 
do not intervene in naturally productive market activity. Instead, 
legal entitlements generate and govern market production. New 
legal rights can give people new power to resist existing market 
constraints, and that transformative power can lead the economy to 
new levels of prosperity and stability. 
Like traditional property rights or the right to incorporate 
businesses, economic human rights can enhance security and 
liquidity by encouraging investments that improve productivity 
both for those who hold the particular rights and society overall.48 
The existing market operates through legal rights designed to 
structure economic incentives to protect against certain forms of 
market pressure. This enables firms and individuals to make 
different, and potentially better, economic choices than would exist 
 
 45. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Annual Lobbying on Health, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=H&year=2016 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2019); see also id. 
 46. K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion 
Through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2448–51 
(2018). 
 47. See id. at 11 (explaining that inequality is a problem of how background legal 
rules operate). 
 48. For a discussion of the contested idea that society overall benefits from an 
entitlement to incorporate, see Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of 
Formal Corporate Power, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1453, 1469–73, 1479–81 (2006). 
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without those particular rights. In standard law and economics 
theory, economic rights like limited liability for corporate investors 
offer protection against risks of large scale coordination and 
planning, so that firms and investors have opportunities for higher 
gains with lower costs that may (in theory) lead to general economic 
growth.49 A broad legal right to free health care similarly can 
insulate people from existing costs that limit their opportunities for 
productive activity likely to benefit society overall. 
For example, at the microeconomic level, that protection can 
create the flexibility and opportunity that encourages greater 
individual achievement. If people can count on access to good health 
care, insulated from the risk of losing their homes, their credit, or 
their retirement savings, they are better able to think about their 
financial futures. Without medical debt and costly insurance, or 
without depending on an insurance-providing job or spouse, 
individuals may be freer to invest in advanced education, new 
business ventures, or in moving to better jobs or communities. 
Businesses may be freer to compete and invest in developing high 
quality products and personnel without unpredictable and 
burdensome employee health care costs. 
Similarly, at the macroeconomic level, encouraging societal 
investment in access to health care may lead to overall economic 
growth.50 Healthier and happier children, workers, and citizens are 
better able to perform at school and on the job and to contribute to 
the well-being of their families and communities. More generally, a 
universal right to health care may produce indirect economic 
benefits by supporting social and political solidarity, trust, and 
confidence. A society that presses individuals and families to make 
tough choices between the risk of losing life-saving health care and 
the risk of financial devastation undermines those intangible 
qualities. This is especially true if individuals perceive their own 
choices as even tougher because the protections are reserved for a 
select group of seemingly less deserving others. 
Economic human rights can not only induce greater 
productivity, but also reduce wasteful administrative costs and 
controls involved in systems that distribute basic human needs as 
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market commodities supplemented by targeted redistributive 
subsidies. Health law scholar Allison Hoffman describes the current 
market approach to U.S. health care as propped up by a massive 
and costly regulatory structure.51 A universal individual right to 
health care, in contrast, could streamline and simplify delivery of 
U.S. health services. This would encourage economies of scope and 
scale and equalizing bargaining power, while also giving patients 
increased flexibility, freedom, and predictability to enhance their 
individual control over care. 
Even though human economic rights can lead to 
transformative improvements in overall economic and social well-
being, it is nonetheless true that the immediate political economic 
context includes costly barriers to such beneficial transformation. 
But those costly barriers are fundamentally a matter of legal and 
political design and ideology, not natural or necessary economics.52  
For example, in the United States, a candidate campaigning to 
expand the Medicare program’s right to health care will confront 
not only simplistic economic thinking, but also an electoral system 
skewed by lavish campaign spending aimed at preserving the 
existing unequal and destructive system of rights to profit from 
scarce and costly health care. That campaign finance system is not 
natural or inevitable but rather results from particular recent 
judicial rulings, such as the Supreme Court’s creation of a First 
Amendment right to electoral spending.53 
To resist the existing structures that make broad economic 
security scarce and unequal, efforts to expand substantive economic 
human rights will depend on concurrent efforts to support and 
improve other general and procedural rights and institutions that 
uphold principles of democracy, fairness, and expansive well-being. 
In the United States, for example, a broad human right to free 
health care need not come at the price of federal funding for 
education or jobs, if we also confront limits on democratic 
government designed to enforce unequal tough tradeoffs.54 A wide 
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range of legal reforms could contribute to undoing the barriers to 
democratic economic rights, such as: changing monetary policy and 
deficit spending rules designed to keep public capital scarce; 
defending expansive Congressional spending powers55; lifting 
constitutional constraints on political campaign spending; re-
districting gerrymandered electoral districts; or prohibiting state 
suppression of voting rights. 
As long as health care is viewed as a costly and confusing 
tradeoff due to natural scarcity, individuals, businesses, medical 
providers, and governments will be forced into destructive 
competition driven by arbitrary and risky bets on human lives. But 
if there were a universal right to high quality health care, 
competitive expertise and societal resources could be re-routed 
toward improving health and prosperity instead. To solve problems 
of inequality and insecurity, we need to advance universal human 
economic rights as not only fundamental for democracy and social 
justice, but also as a necessary element of a sound and successful 
economy. 
3. Education Is Not an Unqualified Good. 
John D. Haskell 
Across the contemporary social imaginary, education enjoys a 
cherished mystique. It is a symbol of virtue to argue for its 
expansion, for deeper investment, for embracing it as a public good. 
But what I want to propose is that there are dark sides and 
unintended dangers to this virtue. 
To set the stage, consider just how encompassing is the modern 
fidelity to education. Historically and politically, education is 
viewed as a pivotal landmark in the long march from status-driven 
aristocratic systems to merit-based democratic societies. Perhaps 
more romantically, it is the embodiment of the Enlightenment spirit 
to dispel superstition and intellectual stagnation through the light 
of reason and progress. In just about any national storyline, 
education never fails to show up heroically. Within the United 
States, for instance, the left-wing scholar Wendy Brown celebrates 
post-war education policy as “the first time in human history [that] 
higher education policy and practice were oriented toward the 
many, tacitly destining them for intelligent engagement with the 
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world, rather than economic servitude or mere survival.”56 
Likewise, the social welfare regimes established over the course of 
the twentieth century throughout Western European states are 
viewed as concrete manifestations of robust democracy, of which 
education is an essential characteristic. As John Keane, a politics 
professor at the University of Sydney, puts it, “social democracy [is] 
defined by its distinctively radical commitment to reducing social 
inequality . . . battl[ing] to empower middle-class and poor 
citizens . . . with better education.”57 And it is a common trope in 
state and nongovernmental bureaus engaged in all aspects of 
governance to blame all kinds of human rights violations and 
desperate social conditions in the formerly colonized world, at least 
in part, on a lack of education which subsequently, it is argued, 
should be remedied post-haste (just think of the most recent poster 
child, Malala Yousafzai).58 
These sentiments are repeated by leading intellectuals and 
politicians irrespective of political orientation. For instance, the 
year 2001 saw the administrations of President George W. Bush of 
the Republican Party in the United States and Prime Minister Tony 
Blair of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom roll out high-
profile educational reforms, with both leaders speaking about their 
reasons and ambitions. Under the tagline “education, education, 
education,” Blair would tell audiences that “there is no greater 
ambition for Britain than to see a steadily rising proportion gain 
the huge benefits of a university education.”59 Across the Atlantic, 
standing at a podium with the left-of-center senator Ted Kennedy 
smiling from behind in support, Bush would begin his keynote 
education speech: “There’s no greater challenge than to make sure 
that every child . . . regardless of where they live, how they’re 
raised, the income level of their family, every child receive a first-
class education in [the United States].”60 A consensus that 
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transcends political boundaries: education, education, education—
and more of it. 
And yet, without necessarily dampening its credentials, there 
is also disillusionment with the education system. A conservative 
populism (at least within the United States), symbolized by the 
election of Donald Trump, is downright fed up with governance 
cultures of experts and, by extension, wary of the education system 
that transforms its children into vassals of an unprincipled liberal 
elite world order.61 Meanwhile, progressives and left-wing 
demographics throughout the industrialized West decry the state of 
higher education as a now “commodified” product in the ever-
widening reach of neoliberalism. To name only a few of education’s 
casualties for most concerned: standardized testing, grade inflation, 
increased bureaucratic auditing practices, and escalating tuition 
fees and corresponding private household debt. 
Whatever one’s position, it seems relatively safe to say (at least 
behind closed doors) that higher education is getting worse, not 
better. Especially for those with more progressive sensibilities 
(conservatives already seem ready to jump ship on the public 
university), the immediate reaction is to propose reforms geared 
specifically toward each perceived crisis. Escalating student debt? 
Make higher education free.62 Charter schools and general 
outsourcing? Reinstate federal and state funding to the public 
education sector.63 Increased administrative burdens on faculty and 
proliferation of management personnel? Decrease the amount of 
management and paperwork, and centralize authority back in the 
hands of faculty.64 All of these proposals can be valuable, but it 
seems to me that in championing education as an essential aspect 
of a robust society, progressives have ended up overselling 
education—and in doing so, inadvertently jeopardized their 
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ultimate goal of an informed, participatory, and more egalitarian 
citizenry.65 In short, the very push for universal higher education 
undermines the perceived goals of universal higher education. 
Here are three vignettes to support this suspicion about the 
promise of higher education. 
A. The Black Box of Indoctrination 
It really was not all that long ago ‘the left’ looked more 
critically at education. The French radical intellectual Louis 
Althusser, for instance, categorized the institution as part of the 
ideological state apparatus, indoctrinating the young into a life of 
servitude.66 What gets taught is as important as access to education, 
and if learning is not only about ideas but routines, there is no 
reason to think that a liberal arts education—to a significant extent 
accustoming students to the vagaries of management and 
paperwork—is an essential component of training generations into 
a more egalitarian and less routinized world. This is not to say that 
higher education is not valuable, but that it is just one of many 
options in the toolkit. Too often advocates push for free, universal 
education without adequately addressing the content of that 
education. Education becomes a black box of progress, obfuscating 
its ideological character. 
B. Daycare and Diversion 
There should be something disconcerting when progressives 
find themselves walking in step with Blair and Bush on higher 
education reform. Of course, the contrast here is usually over the 
cost of education and the extent that schools and teacher survival 
should be pegged to “outcomes”—but this talk colors over the fact 
that what unites most advocates is the call for wider participation 
in higher education, especially from traditionally excluded 
communities.67 This sentiment feels right, but its origins and 
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outcome may be part of the very problem that the feeling seeks to 
ameliorate. First, it is not by chance that the argument for 
universities to increase their student numbers and diversity arises 
simultaneously with the retreat of social services and opportunities 
to the working class. Otherwise disaffected youth prone to rebellion 
and strikes are offered the promise of the golden ticket of upward 
mobility—no longer the western frontier, but the college campus.68 
Here, they can be inculcated into the possibilities of a more 
aesthetic and luxurious life, all the while being monitored, 
surveilled, and vetted for the new governance models they will be 
subject to in adulthood. Second, the push for wider participation in 
higher education diverts attention from the reality that many 
candidates come unprepared for university, already failed by the K–
12 system.69 Calls for higher student university numbers fragments 
our energy from potentially more beneficial targeted reform at 
earlier institutional stages of education, with the university again 
being turned into a daycare.70 And daycares are for children, which 
means discipline and supervision—not worldly creativity. If the 
modernist era invested in the belief that the young would transform 
the old, the postmodern era of today holds youth in a permanent 
state of homeostasis: unequipped to understand what or how to 
change the present, and thereby fearful of the future, prone to docile 
or reactionary adulthoods.71 
C. A New Tragedy of the Commons 
Of course, universities can and should invest in programs for 
nontraditional and less privileged students, and universities are not 
a ‘limited’ resource per se (as might be suggested by the subheading 
here). After all, higher education is traditionally geared toward 
reproduction of the institutional conditions of the current social 
order, which by its unequal character means it is only open to the 
elite and certain sectors of the working class.72 But increasing 
student numbers in university does not transform unequal social 
relations, it further entrenches them. The prestigious jobs will 
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simply come to require higher degree requirements or internships 
that require connections and wealth. And if social participation and 
influence requires more and more certifications, it is again the 
traditionally dispossessed that will bear the brunt of this education-
induced gauntlet. The elite will mobilize new forms of distinction, 
and the older undergraduate university models will come 
increasingly into disrepute, in need of audits and managerial 
oversight, with diminishing returns for students and faculty. 
An assault is unquestionably underway to transform the 
public higher education system to meet systemic imperatives of 
contemporary capitalist governance.73 This is often spoken of 
generally under the moniker neoliberalism, but perhaps more 
accurately could be described according to a set of interlocking 
tendencies: overproduction and fall in the rate of profit resulting in 
recourse to financialization and debt-backed wealth, a fastidious 
reverence to market-based solutions doubling down on bureaucratic 
processes, and breakdown in public collective trust leading to a 
culture of audit, risk-obsession, and standardization.74 But to fight 
this onslaught will take revised consideration of what is to be done. 
A part of that struggle means letting go of this education mantra. 
4. Reducing Job Security Does Not Lead to Growth. 
Jedidiah J. Kroncke 
Among neoclassical economists it is an article of faith that job 
security protections, specifically those that deviate from at-will 
employment, only hurt the workers they are meant to protect.75 
This argument presumes that hiring protections raise the rate of 
unemployment by increasing the relative cost of labor—much like 
any regulatory intervention in labor markets.76 In a similar vein, 
job tenure protections are criticized as degrading general 
productivity by limiting the efficient reallocation of labor within 
firms and by stultifying the churn of Schumpeterian creative 
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destruction in the economy at large.77 The popularity of this 
perspective was at its apex when the World Bank set interest-rate 
penalties based on the strength of a country’s job tenure 
protections.78 While the Bank ultimately abandoned this practice, 
today’s calls for reducing employment protections, generally 
couched as “labor flexibilization,” have been again cited as a 
predictable “lever” to help solve the economic ills of high- and low-
income nations alike.79 
As of yet, no clear policy case study shows an economy 
revitalized after reducing job security protections.80 Even as recent 
scholarship increasingly points to heavy endogeneity restraints on 
labor market reforms, the empirical basis of these anti-employment 
security claims is constructed by correlating extant labor law 
regimes with levels of unemployment, and then attributing 
causality to levels of job security protections.81 Most critically, these 
analyses rarely, if ever, interrogate or account for the legal 
mechanisms or financial expenditures that impact the translation 
of these differences of formal law into practical effects.82 
Not surprisingly, the empirics on the relationship between job 
tenure protections and both firm productivity and general economic 
growth have only grown murkier as the methods and data of labor 
market economics have improved.83 The traditional rejoinder to the 
neoclassic model has been that of institutional economists who 
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argue that such protections, in fact, enhance productivity at the 
firm and social level.84 They contest their neoclassical colleagues on 
parallel quantitative methodological terrain, arguing that job 
turnover is an inherently short-sighted business practice that 
degrades the development of specific human capital and should be 
regulated precisely to incentivize firms to engage in more long-term 
productivity adaptations.85 
Yet, both of these arguments take the citizen as laborer as the 
central frame from which their analyses proceed. If we move to 
consider employment as part of a continuous relationship that 
individuals and social groups have with labor markets over time, 
we can see more clearly not only why labor flexibilization does not 
increase aggregate economic growth, but also why it invariably 
leads to social breakdown and backlash. 
Consider the hypothetical where an individual will know both 
the prospective length of their life and the total income they will 
earn therein. From this position they could plot out their 
consumption perfectly, even with the usual future discounting 
issues. Secondarily, an individual could predict the future returns 
on any investment in human capital, specific or general. Such full 
information would lead to perfectly calibrated allocations of time 
toward current labor and skills training. Yet, most individuals who 
derive their income from modern wage labor enjoy increasingly 
little predictability about future income fluctuations.86 Moreover, 
the general findings of a wide range of academic fields increasingly 
validate, even at the neurological level, that future uncertainty is 
the cognitive condition humans are generally least able to manage 
effectively while maintaining any level of personal satisfaction.87 
Even successful, high-wage earners, including the once idealized 
independent contractor working in creative industries,88 often have 
terrible subjective evaluations of their own well-being when facing 
job insecurity.89 
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These subjective evaluations are rooted in the individual and 
collective dislocations attributed to job insecurity.90 Fundamentally, 
the greater the level of wage unpredictability a worker faces, the 
more suboptimal their job performance and human capital 
investments become.91 And, in turn, the more suboptimal their 
investments in the social groups they participate in become.92 At 
the same time, the financialization of the modern economy places 
greater and greater expectations on citizens to adhere to debt 
obligations, sanctioning those that do not conform to absolute 
regularity in repayment.93 
The specific list of these dislocations leading from job 
insecurity is only growing. Empirical sociology has an expanding 
range of studies establishing the mental health damage that job 
insecurity inflicts.94 Moreover, it is not the onset of episodic job loss 
that is most harmful, but operating, even when employed, under 
conditions of job insecurity.95 Beyond the known destabilizing 
impact of mental health on a wide-range of life outcomes, studies 
have traced job insecurity to tangible physical health 
degradations,96 such as rates of heart disease.97 And the further one 
goes down the socio-economic ladder, the less social and 
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psychological reserves workers have to cope with this stress.98 As a 
result, workers become highly risk-adverse towards any form of 
workplace investment,99 leading to job underperformance and poor 
long-term human capital investment strategies.100 Here we can see 
how even a hypothetical increase in total lifetime wages could lead 
to lower levels of productivity and satisfaction when earned under 
conditions of even marginally greater uncertainty. 
This pattern of individual ill-effects from job insecurity is then 
translated to the social level.101 Individual and systemic job 
insecurity has been linked to greater drawdowns on family financial 
resources,102 lower rates of marriage,103 depressed levels of home 
ownership,104 and other forms of community investment. The more 
longitudinal the frame of analysis becomes, the easier it is to 
imagine all the social capital mechanisms which are short-circuited 
not just by specific job insecurity,105 but also by the geographic 
dislocation that can accompany serial job switching. 
In certain high-income countries, attempts to ameliorate these 
impacts have been described as regimes of “flexicurity” to ease 
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specific job loss transitions.106 But even here difficulties have 
emerged in the face of more precarious work,107 and such regimes 
are only available to those countries that can afford them and 
maintain strong social compacts.108 One notable common thread 
among the recent global rise of neo-nationalist movements in even 
high-income countries has been their idealization of a more 
predictable and socially coherent past.109 
Summarily, job insecurity, whatever hypothetical short-term 
efficiencies it may allow, tears at the very social fabric on which any 
economy depends. The ever-alluring promise of labor 
flexibilization’s impact on aggregate growth is never realized for 
this reason and, concurrently, this is why no systemic depression—
even those that proceed calls for flexibilization—has ever been 
linked to job security itself. By contrast, direct social investments 
in human capital have a much more robust and empirically verified 
impact across the full spectrum of economic and social indicators.110 
While it may seem that the productive energies of a revitalized 
labor market are ever-waiting to materialize for potential 
reformers, the truth is that work across the globe is becoming 
precarious enough without proactive deconstructions of existing 
employment law protections.111 We are already witnessing the 
dislocations of this secular trend in any number of social contexts, 
and the more serious question should be how to create a global legal 
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equilibrium that matches the organic realities of human capital 
formation rather than digital velocity of financial capital. 
5. Distributional Struggles Always Operate Under the 
Background Laws That Determine Property, Contracts, 
and Torts. 
Jamee K. Moudud 
This Essay provides insights from the Law and Political 
Economy perspective and critiques the World Bank and neoclassical 
economics more generally. At the heart of this conventional 
perspective is the claim that government involvement is necessary 
to deal with “market failures” and promote both business 
development and social justice. I want to emphasize here that 
markets are neither “perfect” nor “imperfect,” but are the outcomes 
of a complex bundle of entitlements that determine the nature of 
power struggles.112 I draw on the perspectives of the Legal Realists 
(especially Wesley Hohfeld and Robert Hale) in my own approach. 
In contrast to the mainstream Law and Economics (“L & E”) 
approach, my position has three features. First, property is 
fundamentally a bundle of rights and thus property ownership at 
its core entails coercive power struggles between rivals and between 
owners and non-owners.  Second, law and power relations are 
interrelated.113 These power struggles over economic outcomes 
occur within the context of background laws that determine 
property, contracts, and torts.  Third, I pose the following question: 
if the goal is to understand how legal structures shape power 
struggles, then how are the laws themselves to be determined? 
Here, I would argue that the policy goals that determine the laws 
are themselves the consequences of political and ideational factors 
as authors in the Realist and Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) 
traditions have emphasized. 
I want to next focus on the question of property that lies at the 
heart of the L & E framework.  Drawing on a long intellectual 
tradition, pioneered by the Legal Realists, I counter the standard 
Robinson Crusoe-esque approach to property.  In the conventional 
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view, property is seen as a person’s relationship to an object (say a 
piece of land or a car) based on the doctrine of first possession.114  
This in rem view of property—involving your vertical relationship 
to an object—is basically in Blackstone’s description of property as 
a person’s “despotic dominion” over external things.115  In contrast, 
Legal Realists and the CLS view—known as the progressive view of 
property—conceptualized property in social and relational terms.116  
The use of one’s property invariably has impacts on other people’s 
property—in the Realist view, property was treated as a “bundle of 
rights or entitlements” which determine the damage or costs that 
use of one’s property can inflict on others within the given structure 
of laws.117  Thus: “[A] property right is a relation not between an 
owner and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in 
reference to things”118; it is a bundle of rights determined by the 
legal framework that is in place. 
Such a bundle of rights view of property automatically implies 
that economic relations in capitalism are fundamentally coercive, 
involving adversarial relations between rival property owners and 
between property-owners and non-owners.119  Robert Lee Hale is 
famously associated with the idea that the economy is a network of 
coercive power relations.120  Hale’s framework drew on the 
theoretical framework established by Wesley Hohfeld who in a 
landmark 1913 article121 established a set of fundamental jural 
relations of property holders relative to others such that, as Warren 
Samuels summarized it: 
there is an underlying or implicit structure of advantage and 
disadvantage, of power and of exposure to power, with a 
consequent structure of mutual coercive capacity depending 
upon who has what right, what privilege, what power, and what 
immunity and, therefore, who (else) has what duty, what no-
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right, what liability, and what disability.122 
The “free market” is thus very much a regulatory system—
because laws are by definition regulations—except that it reduces a 
society’s coercive power on owners of capital. 
A. Some Implications 
First, distributional struggles always operate under the 
background laws that determine property, contracts, and torts.  
Consider, in Lochner v. New York, where the Court struck down a 
New York statute that restricted the working hours of bakery 
workers on the grounds that it interfered with the freely arrived at 
contracts of employers and employees.123 In response to the Lochner 
decision, Realists would argue that the more “deregulated” labor 
relations which followed increased employers’ coercive powers over 
employees.  From the Realist standpoint, neoliberalism thus 
increases employers’ coercive power over workers. 
Second, the very notion of property in the Legal Realist 
framework implies that private actions involving one’s own 
property will inevitably have social consequences. This is clear from 
Wesley Hohfeld’s legal taxonomy, which is bipolar: no one is an 
island unto himself.124 This is why, as Warren Samuels argues, 
externalities are ubiquitous in Hale’s analysis and thus: “Every 
exercise of volitional freedom tends to restrict or change the 
volitional freedom of others, through the coercive impact on the 
alternatives open to others.”125  But if externalities are ubiquitous 
then they are the inevitable outcomes of normal market behavior.  
However, if “market failures” are ubiquitous then they are not 
“market failures” anymore!  Quite logically, therefore, there can be 
no such thing as a “perfect” market, which of course implies that 
there is no such thing as an “imperfect” market.  In short, the Legal 
Realist notion of property removes a core conceptual plank of the 
global policy framework, such as those promoted by the World 
Bank. 
Third, the fundamentally coercive nature of property relations 
implies that competition between owners is always a legalized form 
of injury.  In this view of property, there is no place for perfect 
competition—or its opposite in neoclassical theory, some type of 
imperfect competition. Incidentally, those who claim that early 
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capitalism consisted of perfect competition should note the 
following.  In his classic The Transformation of American Law, 
1780–1860, Morton Horwitz argued that the shifts in legal thought 
and policy over the course of the nineteenth century revolved 
around cognizance of the fact that business development by its 
nature involved injurious rivalry amongst competitors.126  As 
Horwitz discusses,127 while the beneficial impacts of business 
competition came to be seen as the key to industrialization, the 
debates about the appropriate legal framework revolved around the 
consequences of the destructive effects of cheaper and/or newer 
technologies adopted by rival firms.128  Thus it came to be 
recognized that “the essential attribute of property ownership was 
the power to develop one’s property regardless of the injurious 
consequences to others.”129  In short, “[p]ermissions to injure play 
an enormously important role in economic life, since all competition 
is legalized injury . . . .”130 Clearly these major debates regarding 
the legal foundations of business competition would not have taken 
place if perfect competition had prevailed! 
It does not follow that the bundle of rights underpinning 
property can be “anything.”  In writing about progressive policies 
(such as job programs, wage increases via strong unions, and 
progressive taxes), Hale wrote that such policies raised workers’ 
bargaining power and increased coercive pressures on capitalists, 
thereby possibly undermining the incentive to invest.131 The 
following quote from Hale is significant in this regard: “A union may 
have power, for instance, to force an immediate advance in wages; 
yet if the wages are pushed beyond a certain limit, the impairment 
of the incentive of the capitalists may before very long react 
unfavorably on the laborers themselves.”132 Thus, a key challenge 
that Hale was implicitly pointing to was how to organize the bundle 
of rights to both provide the incentive to invest and create the 
framework for social and economic rights.  It must be noted that the 
bundle of rights underpinning a firm, for example, determines both 
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the level and the composition of its cost. For example, the 
background rules would determine the level of wages and how 
“hard” employers can pump out productivity increases from workers 
(given the technology). Both of these factors determine the structure 
of unit labor costs and thus prices.  As such, the background laws 
are central to structure of prices in an economy; the latter is not a 
natural phenomenon! As also emphasized by Karl Polanyi, the 
market is deeply political; it is neither pre-legal nor pre-political as 
in the neoclassical tradition.133 
6. Entrepreneurship Can Be Unproductive or Destructive. 
Frank Pasquale 
In the contemporary American law school, few figures are as 
lionized as the “entrepreneur.”134 Business law courses tend to offer 
a narrative of wise incremental development of doctrine toward 
enabling disruption, easy entry into markets, and ultra-flexible 
corporate forms.135 The lawyer is ideally, in this view, a fixer 
capable of profit-maximizing distributions of responsibility and 
liability.136 Some even dream of automating this role via smart 
contracts, to ensure even more rapid entrepreneurial activity.137 
Professional responsibility courses also tend to adopt a similarly 
reverential attitude toward the business client, instilling an ethic of 
“zealous advocacy” in generations of students.138 
This emphasis on the disruptive and new is jarring in law, 
because legal systems’ internal values so often prize stability, 
regularity, precedent, and tradition. Pressed to justify it, partisans 
of disruptive innovation often turn to economics—a discipline all too 
happy to oblige with just-so stories of creative destruction.139 As 
William Baumol has observed, where economic growth has slowed, 
it is often “implied that a decline in entrepreneurship was partly to 
blame (perhaps because the culture’s ‘need for achievement’ has 
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atrophied). At another time and place, it is said, the flowering of 
entrepreneurship accounts for unprecedented expansion.”140 Both 
policymakers and mainstream legal scholars tiptoe through the 
tulips of entrepreneurship, wary of disrupting the business plans of 
the disruptive innovators they admire. 
However, as Baumol went on to wisely observe, there is no 
obvious connection between entrepreneurship and genuine 
productivity.141 Productivity, defined from a properly politico-
economic perspective, reflects society’s ability to meet real needs 
and to promote human flourishing.142 Some entrepreneurs 
contribute to it, but others do not. As Baumol observes, there are 
unproductive entrepreneurial activities, and “at times the 
entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical existence that is actually 
damaging to the economy.”143  Baumol also argues that the relative 
balance of productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurs 
is not dictated by technology or culture.144  “Changes in the rules 
and other attendant circumstances can, of course, modify the 
composition of the class of entrepreneurs,” he reminds us, insisting 
on the intertwining of political and economic reality.145 
Law students tend to hear little to nothing about Baumol’s 
distinctions here, despite his status as one of the greatest 
economists of the twentieth century. That is because the 
epistemological appeal of many dominant law and economics 
approaches is grounded in an ostensibly value-free and scientific 
assessment of the costs and benefits of different sets of legal 
rules.146 Describing certain economic activity as useless or 
parasitical is a value judgment. Better instead, in the eyes of the 
simplistic law and economics that animates all too much of legal 
pedagogy, to stick to more quantitative assessments of monetary 
value, or abstract descriptions of optimal legal rules that “neutrally” 
apply trans-substantively, without respect to the nature of the 
business they are affecting. 
The problems with such an approach are readily apparent. 
First, there are obvious instances of entrepreneurship that leave 
everyone (except the entrepreneur) worse off. Trade in illicit drugs 
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has devastated communities in North, Central, and South America.  
In later work, Baumol described the international arms trade as 
another example: rapidly cheapening implements of destruction, 
and making them more readily available, is not a form of efficiency 
to be celebrated without further analysis of their role in particular 
conflicts.147 There may be cases where this arms trade enables a 
scrappy band of rebels to overcome an oppressive tyranny. But far 
more common are other dynamics: consolidation of power by 
tyrannical regimes; arms races among factions within a nation, and 
nations themselves; or out-of-control armaments easily snapped up 
by terrorist forces.148 
Similarly, in banking, all too often legislators and regulators 
rush to promote “financial innovation” without fully understanding 
its consequences. For example the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (via its proposed “fintech charters”) and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (via its Project Catalyst) are promoting 
financial technology (fintech) firms.149 Fintech may promote 
competition and create new options for consumers. But we should 
ensure that it is fair competition, and that these options don’t have 
hidden pitfalls. In my research on the finance and internet sectors, 
I have explored patterns of regulatory arbitrage and opaque 
business practices that sparked the mortgage crisis of 2008.150 I see 
similar themes emerging today. 
In the run-up to the crisis, federal authorities preempted state 
law meant to protect consumer borrowers.151 Their stated aim was 
to ensure financial inclusion and innovation, but the unintended 
consequences were disastrous.152 Federal authorities were not 
adequately staffed to monitor, let alone deter or punish, widespread 
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fraudulent practices.153 They also flattened diverse state policies 
into a one-size-fits-all, cookie-cutter approach.154 We all know the 
results. Millions of families lost their homes to foreclosure, and the 
economy suffered a permanent output gap that undermines our 
nation’s strength to this day.155 
In short: entrepreneurship and innovation are not good in 
themselves. The toxic assets at the core of the financial crisis were 
innovative in many ways, but ultimately posed unacceptable 
risks.156 Entrepreneurial arms dealers could easily provide 
massively destructive weapons to terrorists. Drug dealers 
externalize the harms their products generate, while enjoying 
massive profits. Many less troubling products and services have 
shadow sides that outweigh their ostensible benefits.157 Until law 
and economics places such concerns at the core of its inquiry—
rather than relegating them to backwater arenas of externality 
correction and transfers—it will fail to account for core economic 
dynamics. Law and political economy addresses these issues 
directly, as an intersecting realm of monetary value and social 
values. 
7. Unemployment Isn’t Natural, It’s a Creature of Legal 
Design. 
Raúl Carrillo 
Frank Pasquale recently highlighted a fundamental flaw in 
standard Law & Economics thinking.158 The old paradigm holds 
that mandates for higher quality jobs necessarily reduce aggregate 
jobs available to workers. This crude and shallow “economism” 
argues the state must either compel firms to maintain better paid, 
better trained, or better cared-for workers, or allow firms to hire 
more workers overall.159 
Pasquale deftly dispenses with this false dichotomy. The 
argument is empirically deficient: no evidence supports the 
existence of the supposed trade-off.160 Furthermore, the framing is 
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conceptually unsound: as Pasquale notes, workplaces are 
government creatures, so resetting permissions and prohibitions 
within them is not so much state intervention, as an adjustment 
with an impact dependent upon the broader system the government 
controls.161 
In general, standard Law and Economics fails to account for 
the state’s design of the labor system. Borrowing from Neoclassical 
economists, most subscribers suggest some level of unemployment 
is natural: a tendency of the labor market anterior to the state. 
From this perspective, workers seek to freely match with employers 
and concretize their pairings via labor contracts. Although the state 
may regulate the quality of these contracts, regulation tends to 
reduce the total quantity of contracts and thus employment, as well 
as infringing upon freedom. 
Heterodox economists have argued against this vision for 
decades. Noting that labor is fundamentally distinct from other 
commodities, they argue there is no market for labor in the 
aggregate.162 While firms hire and fire based on profit expectations, 
most laborers work where they can to survive.163 Because workers 
do not truly have a choice to sell their labor or not, it does not make 
sense to think of a comprehensive market.164 Even if it did, 
“intervention” would still be an incoherent concept. Because the 
state creates and administers the “background rules” of the labor 
system, which coerce people to work, the laws of the state 
‘constitute’ rather than merely ‘govern’ the labor system, rendering 
the idea of intervention nonsensical.165 
The United States government did not invent “employment” 
and “unemployment,” of course. Rather, it inherited a legal 
architecture of work from the British Empire.166 Throughout the 
18th century, Parliament stripped peasants of their rights to land, 
compelling them to work for landowners to survive.167 As Robert Lee 
Hale argued, this process of legal coercion continued in the United 
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States.168 Over time, the U.S. government spread the wage labor 
system, enclosing the lands of indigenous peoples,169 allowing 
women to perform wage work for men, welcoming poor migrant 
workers, and, monumentally, turning slaves into “freedmen” 
without land or other capital.170 As governments legally eliminated 
the material preconditions for self-sufficiency, they birthed the 
modern concepts of “unemployment” and “employment.”171 
In the contemporary United States, workers face a specific 
challenge. We cannot work for mere biophysical resources. Rather, 
we must work for money, specifically U.S. legal tender, which can 
settle private debts, and must satisfy public debts to the state (most 
notably, taxes). As Duncan Kennedy has noted, people may now 
receive income outside of labor compensation, but broadly speaking, 
even with the welfare state, people must sell their labor for 
money.172 Property, contract, and tort law, along with the criminal 
laws that protect and reinforce them, set the stage for a struggle for 
currency. If we do not find a way to produce money on our own, we 
must toil. 
Leftists often argue that the “reserve army of the unemployed” 
173 is a feature of the system, necessary to maintain a monetary 
production economy. U.S. legal history supports this contention. 
Beyond merely upholding the “background rules,” the U.S. 
government has explicitly committed to a labor system that relies 
on some level of involuntary unemployment. 
Twice during the 20th century, progressive and radical 
legislators attempted to codify an explicit commitment to true full 
employment. After World War II, and again in the 1970s, Congress 
considered creating a duty for the federal government to serve as 
an employer of last resort, providing a job to any job seeker.174 
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Although both attempts resulted in legislation that improved the 
system, they failed to guarantee jobs.175 Arguably, the second effort 
reified the systemic necessity of involuntary unemployment. 
Although the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 
nominally commits the Federal Reserve System to strive toward full 
employment as well as price stability, the life of the law has shown 
that the central bank is committed to depressing wages and 
prohibiting true full employment in the name of price stability.176 
Despite the absence of inflation accompanying recent low 
unemployment rates, Federal Reserve System officials insist tens of 
millions of people, mostly people of color, must be held in idleness.177 
They do this despite even right-wing criticism that a buffer stock of 
unemployed people is neither an effective nor necessary means of 
inflation control.178 
Even the courts play a role in cementing the unjust labor 
system, beyond enforcing the background rules. On two occasions, 
federal courts have defended the executive branch from class action 
lawsuits alleging the President failed to fulfill his part of the 1978 
full employment mandate.179 Relatedly, courts have refused to 
recognize a right to dignified work. Justice Thurgood Marshall once 
argued “[E]very citizen who applies for a government job is entitled 
to it unless the government can establish some reason for denying 
the employment.”180 His associates did not agree even with this 
statement.181 Constitutional law scholars have argued that 
Reconstruction Amendment doctrine implicates a right to a job.182 
Courts, again, have disagreed.183 
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Overall, the major U.S. government organs have perpetuated 
an unfair labor system rooted in false scarcity. To contest 
constraints on firms as labor market interventions is to miss the 
legal and economic reality. Nothing about current employment 
policy is “natural” or “free.” No ironclad rules prevent us from 
transforming the system, from ensuring public employment just as 
we ensure public education and other programmatic rights. In a 
better future, we can confidently design a Job Guarantee program 
whereby we provide work for everyone who wants it.184 This 
program would be no more or no less of an “intervention” than 
maintaining the status quo. 
8. Money Isn’t Scarce—It’s Infinite. 
Rohan Grey 
The founders of the Chicago School of Law & Economics set 
out to improve legal decision-making by incorporating economic 
‘principles’ into the law.185 From the outset, they envisaged this 
interdisciplinary flow of ideas to be mostly unidirectional, on the 
grounds that the discipline of ‘economics,’ defined narrowly around 
contemporary neoclassical microeconomics, had far greater insights 
to offer the law than vice-versa.186 However, notwithstanding Law 
& Economics’ success in transforming much of contemporary 
jurisprudence in its image, it remains premised on foundational 
assumptions that on close inspection, are revealed to be legally 
incoherent.   
Perhaps the most egregious premise of contemporary 
neoclassical microeconomics, and thus Law & Economics, is that of 
capital scarcity. One of the first lessons economics programs impart 
to their students is that “there’s no such thing as a free lunch.”187 
Indeed, for many, the study of “economics” is defined entirely as the 
study of the allocation of scarce resources.188 Under such a view, the 
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baseline “equilibrium” state of the economy is one in which such 
scarce resources are fully utilized, and distributional questions can 
be reduced to zero-sum transfers. Social problems like 
unemployment are defined as economic “imperfections,” mere 
abnormalities or deviations from an otherwise optimal baseline. 
The paramount question becomes: which Peter should be robbed in 
order to pay Paul?189  At the same time, money—the medium via 
which economic activity is primarily conducted— is treated as little 
more than a veil over the value of the finite real goods and services 
being transacted. 
On first glance, the idea of economic scarcity seems 
reasonable, especially when applied to the realm of real, physical 
things like factories, humans, and the environment. However, it 
falls apart when we consider property interests of economic value 
that are not tangible or finite, including tradeable information, 
intellectual property rights, and, perhaps most importantly, money 
itself. As any corporate lawyer can attest, such forms of ‘capital’ are 
legally constructed, and thus their ‘supply’ is socially determined.190 
Accordingly, it makes no more sense to talk about a ‘scarcity’ of 
data, copyrights, or dollars than it does to talk about a scarcity of 
the human imagination. 
Nevertheless, Law & Economics practitioners continue to 
downplay the legal and physically unbound nature of money itself, 
even as they strive to extract monetary value from ever more facets 
of social life. Indeed, Richard Posner himself admitted to not having 
bothered to read Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money until after the 2008 global financial crisis 
because, in his view, “it was a work of macroeconomics,” and “[l]aw, 
and hence the economics of law . . . did not figure largely in the 
regulation of those phenomena.”191 At the same time, the rest of the 
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legal academy has also had relatively little to say about money. As 
Roy Kreitner observed in 2012: 
Imagine a student comes to office hours and wants to study the 
legal history of contract, tort, or marriage. One barely has to 
think to get her started in the right direction, and there may 
even be encyclopedia articles from which to draw initial 
bibliographies [ . . . ] Nothing of the sort exists for the legal 
history of money—at least, not yet.192 
Such chronic neglect is particularly befuddling given the 
central role of financial considerations in almost every aspect of the 
law and legal practice. Perhaps even more significantly, the 
financial system is itself legally constructed.193 All financial 
instruments, including those we consider “money,” are ultimately 
tradeable legal obligations, or debts. Some are created privately 
through the formation of contracts, while others are created by the 
state. At the same time, different obligations have different legal 
properties: debts issued by private actors are typically settled by the 
tendering of the obligation of a third party (i.e. government 
currency, or bank deposits), while public monetary instruments are 
extinguished when the holder tenders them in order to obtain relief 
from any legal liability incurred via fees, fines, and/or taxes.194 
Whereas certain kinds of financial instruments such as coins 
or mortgage-backed securities may only be issued by specific legally 
approved entities, others, like promissory notes, can be issued by 
almost anyone. At the same time, instruments issued by more 
creditworthy or economically significant actors tend to have a 
higher degree of “moneyness” than instruments issued by less 
creditworthy or important actors.195 Consequently, most personal 
IOU-like instruments are risky and rarely circulate beyond one’s 
own personal networks, while government obligations such as 
currency and treasury securities are considered to be the most safe 
and liquid kinds of monetary instruments.196 
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This vision of a hierarchy of monies, of varying qualities, with 
public liabilities at the top of the hierarchy, reflects the great 
economist Hyman Minsky’s famous dictum: anyone can create 
money, the challenge is to get it accepted.197 Or, as Alfred Mitchell-
Innes observed over a century ago, money’s origins lie not in the 
unique physical properties of gold, or any other commodity, but in 
large, socially-managed credit networks.198 The great invisible 
financial scoreboard-in-the-sky keeps track of everyone’s balance 
sheet positions, with credits and debits coming in and out of 
existence as new relationships are formed, and old ones 
extinguished. In such a world, there is no inherent scarcity of 
purchasing power. Rather, limits on the growth of financial activity 
are determined by the availability of borrowing opportunities, the 
perceived profitability of investments, and/or the degree of 
acceptance of different types of financial instruments.199 In other 
words, in advanced economies with sophisticated legal and financial 
systems, monetary and financial capital is not scarce, but abundant. 
The notion of ‘capital abundance’ has profound implications for 
how lawyers, economists, and policymakers view the economy. For 
example, it is commonplace among Law & Economics scholars to 
assert that governments require taxation or borrowing (paid with 
future taxes) in order to fund their ongoing fiscal spending 
commitments. Contrary to this view, however, governments in fact 
have access to a range of instruments they can and do issue to 
finance new spending ex nihilo, ranging from coins and physical 
notes, to treasury and central bank notes and securities. The fact 
that such instruments must definitionally be first spent into 
circulation before they can be taxed back out subverts the commonly 
held view that taxes are necessary to provide revenue for 
government spending. Indeed, as Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York President Beardsley Ruml observed in a speech to the 
American Bar Association in 1946: 
The necessity for a government to tax in order to maintain both 
its independence and its solvency is true for state and local 
governments, but it is not true for a national 
government . . . .[W]hose currency, for domestic purposes, is not 
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convertible into gold or any commodity. It follows that our 
Federal Government has final freedom from the money market 
in meeting its financial requirements . . . .[T]he inevitable 
social and economic consequences of any and all taxes have now 
become the prime consideration in the imposition of taxes.200 
Thus, Ruml concludes, “[t]he public purpose which is served 
should never be obscured in a tax program under the mask of 
raising revenue.”201 
Ruml’s point about taxation can be expanded to a more general 
maxim: when it comes to money, the legal profession must abandon 
its false naturalism.202 Money is not just a “thing,” it is a malleable 
legal technology that can be made to serve varying interests and 
stakeholders, depending on its design and use. 
9. International Trade Does Not Have to Undermine Social 
Protection. 
James J. Varellas III 
In recent years, international trade negotiations have been at 
the forefront of public policy and debate in a way they have not since 
the collapse of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks after the 
protests in Seattle in 1999.203 Most significantly, the U.S. and a 
number of its key trading partners embarked on a new strategy of 
negotiating, what came to be known as “Mega-regional free trade 
agreements” (Mega-FTAs), after more than a decade of failed 
attempts to restart talks on a new round of multilateral 
negotiations at the WTO.204 The most important of these were the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed twelve-country trading 
bloc with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $27.4 trillion, 
comprising approximately 40% of the world economy, and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a 
proposed agreement between the U.S. and the European Union, two 
regions that combined would form an even larger Mega-FTA bloc 
than the TPP.205 
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One of the most notable aspects of these new U.S.-led Mega-
FTAs is that they intended to go far beyond tariff issues, such as 
the need to rationalize the so-called “noodle bowl” of bilateral trade 
agreements that had proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region since 
the WTO,206 to reach what are often called “behind the border” 
issues of domestic law and regulation. This behind-the-border 
agenda of liberalization, deregulation, and marketization even 
encompassed such critical concerns as health, the environment, 
safety, physical security, and banking and financial regulation.207 
In addition, TPP and TTIP also proposed investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) mechanisms that would enable foreign investors 
to bring challenges to a state’s domestic regulations before an 
international arbitration tribunal.208 As a result of the threat that 
these agreements would empower multinational corporations and 
foreign investors at the expense of the ability of sovereign states to 
protect their citizens, civil society groups in both the U.S. and other 
nations mobilized against TPP and TTIP. 
This agenda for ever-deeper liberalization was more or less 
consistent with the sensibilities of Washington’s elite consensus on 
international trade, a consensus with strong intellectual roots in 
neoclassical economics and law and economics, and most of the 
initial civil society criticism and mobilization against TPP and TTIP 
came from groups on the left. However, in time a new generation of 
nationalist and nativist politicians on the right also began attacking 
these agreements. Perhaps the most prominent among these right-
populist critics has been Donald Trump, who made opposition to 
TPP and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a 
centerpiece of his successful campaign for the presidency. While 
trade politics had featured prominently in other recent presidential 
elections,209 Trump was serious about his criticisms: he withdrew 
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the U.S. from the TPP on his first full workday in office210 after 
giving an inauguration speech promising “[f]rom this this [sic] day 
forward, it’s going to be only America first.”211 
The significance of this political shift on trade is underscored 
by the likelihood that the failure of TPP, which had been a 
centerpiece of the Obama administration’s Asia strategy, will 
enable Asian countries—perhaps through China’s own Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade initiative—to 
rationalize the “noodle bowl” problem on their own with a trade bloc 
not dominated by the U.S. or its preferences (including not sharing 
the TPP’s “behind the border” ambitions),212 thus undermining U.S. 
interests in the region.213 As Harley Shaiken has noted, Trump’s 
nationalist opposition to TPP can be contrasted with the 
internationalism of the opposition from progressive civil society 
groups on the left, who have long focused on the details of “who wins 
and who loses” in an international trade agreement and how new 
trade deals can be made and existing trade deals remade to set 
“rules of the game insuring that trade benefits workers, consumers, 
communities, and the environment” in all countries instead of 
further empowering corporations and investors.214 
The experience of the 1930s provides a striking historical 
precedent to the present moment on many issues, including trade, 
because then the nationalist right also purported to take up the 
cause of protecting society from the ravages of laissez-faire and 
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international trade that prioritized the interests of industry. In his 
1944 classic The Great Transformation, the political economist Karl 
Polanyi argued that the political upheavals of the 1930s needed to 
be understood from the perspective of the failure of the liberal-
utopian project of subjecting society to governance by a purportedly 
self-adjusting and self-regulating market.215 By the time the last 
countries abandoned the classical gold standard and the 
international system of free trade collapsed in the 1930s, political 
movements aiming to remake society—all of which Polanyi saw as 
part of a “double movement” against market civilization—had 
begun taking power around the world: the New Deal in the U.S., 
fascism in Europe, social democracy and democratic socialism 
elsewhere in Europe, and Soviet state socialism all sought to limit 
the ravages of the market in one way or another.216 Writing as 
World War II drew to a close, Polanyi warned that the collapse of 
nineteenth century liberalism’s project of a market civilization had 
made clear that the only viable and sustainable alternative to 
totalitarianism and fascism was a post-war society in which 
markets were once more embedded within society (and thus put in 
the service of human needs).217 
Once the character of the new international trading order built 
after World War II had become clear several decades later, scholars 
such as Fred Block and John Ruggie continued the analysis where 
Polanyi left off.218 As Ruggie put it, the international monetary and 
trading order of the postwar decades was characterized by a “fusion 
of power and legitimate social purpose” in the form of what he styled 
the “embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic 
nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; 
unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its 
multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic 
interventionism” in service of policies such as full employment.219 
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From this perspective, the neoliberal trade agreements that have 
become familiar over the past 30 or so years, such as TPP, TTIP, 
and NAFTA, are radical departures from the more socially 
protective trading order of the initial postwar period, and the need 
to return to a more balanced trading system that puts human needs 
before the rights of multinational corporations and investors can 
serve as an organizing principle for formulating an international 
trading order, as well as a complementary and supporting 
international monetary system, for a post-neoliberal age. 
Looking forward from the decades of economic and political 
catastrophe culminating in World War II, Polanyi argued the 
individualistic conception of economic “freedom” of the classical 
liberals and their economic models, for which the classical system 
of “free trade” was perhaps the greatest accomplishment, 
represented a false utopia because the scale of hardship it entailed 
for people and their environment rendered it socially unsustainable. 
As a result, the collision between the marketization of life and what 
Polanyi called “the reality of society” inevitably leads to political 
and social movements that seek to restore social protection, either 
through the right’s “relinquishing [of] freedom and glorifi[cation of] 
power” or the left’s “uphold[ing of] the claim to freedom, in spite of 
[the necessity of socially organized regulation].”220 While Polanyi 
did not foresee a revival of the project of market civilization, the rise 
of neoliberalism beginning in the 1970s, and the accompanying 
explosion in economic inequality and ecological crisis,221 appears to 
point to another stark political choice between reaction and fascism 
on the one hand, or a new left project of recreating “the meaning of 
freedom in a complex society” by “remov[ing] all removable injustice 
and unfreedom.”222 As with other domains of law and policy, the 
latter project entails remaking the international trading regime so 
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that it once again elevates the protection of society, human needs, 
and other conditions conducive to human flourishing in the broadest 
sense over maximizing corporate profits.223 Ruggie’s account of the 
embedded liberalism compromise shows clearly that such a regime 
can be a viable alternative to the type of right-populist demands for 
protection from free trade voiced by politicians such as Trump.224  
International trade does not have to undermine social protection. 
10. Transaction Costs Matter. 
Reza Dibadj 
Neoclassical law and economics assumes that private actors, 
left to their own bargaining, will achieve an optimal allocation of 
resources. In the words of the indefatigable Richard Posner, 
“resources tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if 
voluntary exchange—a market—is permitted.”225 This tradition 
claims its intellectual roots in a landmark article by Ronald Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost,226 where he first posits that private 
parties can achieve an optimal distribution of resources regardless 
of how initial entitlements are distributed.227 However, neoclassical 
adherents conveniently limit their analysis to the first part of 
Coase’s article, where he highlights a theoretical world of zero 
transaction costs.228 In the real world, of course, transaction costs 
matter and include “search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs.”229 
Unfortunately for such simplistic assumptions, transaction 
costs matter. As just one example, consider that the modern firm 
would not even exist in a world of zero transaction costs.230 After all, 
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if business could be transacted via the price mechanism, there 
would be no need for organizations to have developed alongside 
markets.231 
The supervening irony in all of this is that the second part of 
Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost plainly states that the 
“argument has proceeded up to this point on the 
assumption . . .  that there were no costs involved in carrying out 
market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic 
assumption.”232 In a later book, Coase points out quite clearly that 
the “world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a 
Coasian world.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  It is the 
world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to 
persuade economists to leave.”233 He even postulates that: 
There is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental 
administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in 
economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely 
when . . . a large number of people are involved and in which 
therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market 
or the firm may be high.234 
What is fascinating is that Coase’s logic unwittingly leads in 
the same direction as that espoused by the leading twentieth 
century welfare economist, A.C. Pigou,235 whose work Coase 
initially set out to refute.236  The law and economics literature 
virtually ignores this point.237 
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Fortunately, in the ensuing decades an entire branch of 
economics, transaction cost economics (TCE), has developed in 
response to this reality.238 Most notably, recent Nobel laureate 
Oliver Williamson has convincingly argued that TCE “holds that 
alternative modes of governance differ in discrete structural ways.  
Incentive intensity, administrative controls, and contract law 
regime are the key attributes out of which private sector governance 
works.”239 Yet, leaving aside for the moment the impact of TCE 
within economics qua economics, transaction costs remain under-
studied in law & economics.240 
11. Competition Can Be Socially Corrosive and Wasteful. 
Sandeep Vaheesan 
Competition is one of the talismanic words in law and 
economics, and indeed, American life. Competition is hailed as an 
unqualified good and often touted as a solution to what ails society 
today. The value of competition is endorsed across most of the 
ideological spectrum. Conservatives decry the lack of competition in 
schools and taxi cab services.241 Progressives highlight the dearth 
of competition among multinational corporations and call for a 
revival of antitrust law.242 
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While reinvigorating competition between large corporations 
would transfer power and wealth from big businesses to consumers, 
workers, small businesses, and citizens,243 a general promotion of 
competition would not have salutary effects. On the contrary, 
competition can produce negative economic, political, and social 
impacts. Competition is desirable in certain areas but undesirable 
and detrimental to societal welfare in other areas. Three examples 
illustrate how competition is deficient as a general social organizing 
principle and should be promoted selectively, not categorically. 
Some infrastructure services are natural monopolies and not 
conducive to market competition. Electricity, natural gas, and 
water distribution are examples of natural monopolies. Due to 
economies of scale, these services are generally best provided 
through a single entity rather than through multiple competing 
entities. In concrete terms, building and operating a single electric 
transmission line is more cost effective than building and operating 
five parallel competing lines. Given these cost structures, 
competition is not socially desirable and likely to lead to wasteful 
duplication and higher rates for the public. At the retail level, the 
success of competition in essential services requires a critical mass 
of users to have the time, ability, and interest to comparison shop 
across providers—a questionable proposition.244 Instead of relying 
on competing providers in markets, vital infrastructure is typically 
provided through a publicly-regulated or publicly-owned firm. 
Past attempts at introducing competition into natural 
monopoly sectors counsel skepticism going forward. So-called 
“deregulatory” programs have sometimes transformed publicly-
regulated monopolies into unconstrained, highly extractive, and 
dangerous monopolies and oligopolies. Consider the rampant 
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manipulation in California’s wholesale electricity market in 2000 
245 and the disastrous program to inject competition into railways 
in the United Kingdom.246 These examples suggest that in 
infrastructure provision the imperfections of public regulation or 
ownership are much more tolerable than the imperfections of 
(nominal) competitive markets. 
Labor markets are another area in which greater competition 
can be harmful. Specifically, unchecked competition between 
workers can lead to lower wages, the elimination of employment 
benefits, and increased precariousness. An extreme example would 
be to abolish child labor laws in the name of promoting labor market 
competition. Karl Polanyi argued that treating labor as just another 
“commodity” and encouraging unrestrained competition among 
workers corroded the foundations of society in industrializing 
England.247 
Thanks to labor market restraints, a sizable fraction of the 
working classes in the Western world enjoyed material abundance 
and security in the postwar era. By unionizing and limiting 
competition among themselves, workers built countervailing power 
against employers. This was particularly true in heavy industry. 
Through unionization, industrial workers boosted wages and 
benefits for themselves and set labor market norms that helped 
workers in non-unionized sectors as well.248 
The big business-led attack on the social democratic state and 
labor market institutions of the postwar period has reversed the 
broad-based prosperity of the so-called thirty glorious years. Due to 
the successful campaign against unions and the resulting 
atomization of the labor force,249 power in labor markets has tilted 
decisively in favor of employers.250 And developed nations have 
promoted a “globalization” project that favors the interests of 
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multinational corporations251 and pits workers around the world, 
especially those in manufacturing, in direct competition with each 
other.252 The increase in competition between workers both 
domestically and internationally has contributed to the diminished 
standing of labor. Even as labor productivity has increased, median 
wages in the United States have stagnated since the 1970s.253 
In government, competition between political entities is likely 
to yield destructive races to the bottom. For instance, cities and 
states may compete against each other to attract highly mobile 
corporations to set up or expand operations in their jurisdictions.254 
This competition may take the form of generous tax holidays and 
public subsidies. As they entice corporations to relocate and expand, 
state and local governments starve themselves of resources. 
Because they lack the monetary sovereignty of the federal 
government and do not control the supply of currency, states and 
cities that shrink their revenue bases and increase their 
expenditures through these carrots to big business may face serious 
budgetary constraints. They may have to cut vital public services 
and collect revenue through much less equitable means, such as 
draconian fines and penalties on the working class and poor.255 
Competition among U.S. banking regulators was a contributor 
to the global economic crisis in 2007-08. To increase their budgets 
and expand their jurisdictions, regulators competed to persuade 
financial institutions to charter with them. This competition took 
the form of promising supervised entities more relaxed oversight of 
financial speculation and consumer lending than what “rival” 
regulators offered.256 
The recent contest between cities and states to attract 
Amazon’s second headquarters is a dramatic example of this 
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insidious political competition. By putting out a request for 
proposals for its second headquarters, Amazon fully exploited inter-
city and inter-state rivalry. Municipalities and states pledged to 
shower Amazon with subsidies, infrastructure investments, and tax 
holidays and even transfer core functions of sovereignty to the 
online retail giant.257 For instance, Illinois offered to let Amazon 
collect and keep fifty percent of the income taxes that employees at 
the second headquarters would pay to the state.258 In exchange for 
the promise of 50,000 jobs and prestige, the winner of this contest 
may have deprived itself of significant tax revenues and placed 
itself in a fiscal straightjacket. 
Due to a dearth of competition in numerous product and labor 
markets, monopolistic and oligopolistic corporations possess and 
exercise the power to prosper at the expense of consumers, workers, 
businesses, and citizens. The United States does need a discrete 
competition—or more precisely an antimonopoly—program. Yet, 
competition is not a sound social organizing principle and has major 
deficiencies. In many areas, competition is likely to have perverse 
effects. Injecting competition into the provision of infrastructure 
and increasing competition between workers and governments can 
deepen existing immiseration, inequality, and insecurity. Rather 
than help us return to a comparative golden age of social democracy, 
a blind promotion of competition across domains may, in actuality, 
accelerate the decades-long transfer of power and wealth from the 
many to the few. 
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